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Treaty Compliance and Violation
Beth Simmons
Submitted to the Annual Review of Political Science
12 November 2009
A treaty is a formal agreement between sovereign states, usually documented in
writing. Such formal agreements are central to the conduct of international relations. It
would be hard to write an international history of the western world without some
reference to the Treaties of Westphalia (1648), which some credit with the foundations of
the modern state system, the Treaty of Paris (1814), which defined the end of the
Napoleonic era, or the Versailles Treaty (1919), which informed generations of leaders
how not to secure post-war peace. It would similarly be difficult to understand the
modern system of world trade without some reference to the 1948 General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade or the more recent 1995 Marrakesh agreement that created the World
Trade Organization, or to understand post World War II security arrangements without
reference to the 1949 North Atlantic Treaty or the 1955 Warsaw Pact. Beginning in the
1960s, a series of human rights treaties have supported the “rights revolution”
characteristic of the latter twentieth century. International treaties are one of the oldest
forms of communication among sovereigns and some 3,000 multilateral and 27,000
bilateral treaties are in effect today.1 While treaties hardly reflect the totality of state-tostate relationships even in the West, they are certainly crucial documents for conducting
international relations.
Ask any legal scholar why treaties are important, and she will very likely mention
their “legally binding” nature. Treaties generally create legal obligations among states
1
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that are parties to them. Treaties are not the only source of international legal obligation;
international law scholars will also point to customary international law as a legitimate
source of legal obligation among states as well. Political scientists have scarcely studied
customary international law at all. For many empirical researchers, custom derived from
practice has the feel of circularity if the research motivation is to understand international
law’s influence on behavior. Custom is also substantively harder to grasp: its rules are
often hard to establish because it is not written down, and unlike in the domestic context,
the resort to legal clarifications by international courts is rare. Because political science
research has largely focused on treaties (synonyms include accords, agreements,
conventions and covenants), these will be the focus of this article.
While all treaties are obligation-creating legal instruments, not all are equally
“binding.” The legal literature distinguishes “hard law” and “soft law” (Shelton 1997)
and treaties while always obligatory can contain both. The key is in the language chosen
to describe the obligation. “Must” is the language of hard law; “should” is that of soft
law. Hence, obligations – even those contained in treaties – can have shades of
stringency. Duncan Snidal and Kenneth Abbott argue that states choose hard law
language when they want to avoid high transaction costs associated with future
interactions, but prefer soft law when negotiation costs are high (Abbott & Snidal 2000).
This is an example of a broader set of issues that is certainly relevant to treaty violation:
how the agreement was written in the first place (Koremenos 2005; Koremenos et al
2001; Rosendorff & Milner 2001; Smith 2000). “Details” about membership, escape
clauses, and dispute settlement can influence violation and compliance, and while this
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article does not treat the question of institutional design as a distinct subsection, it is
central to some of the literature discussed below.
Finally, it is worth noting that states are only bound by international treaties if
they have ratified them, and ratification itself is not obligatory; it is based on consent.
Ratification rules vary by state, and some of the approaches discussed below specifically
take the mode of ratification into account, theorizing that higher ratification “hurdles”
imply real dedication to the purposes of the agreement and hence augur well for
compliance. Many research designs designate ratification itself as the “treatment” that is
theorized to influence the behavioral outcome of interest (Hathaway 2002; Simmons
2009). The approach potentially underestimates broader treaty effects, since norms
contained in treaties could be internalized and practiced by non-ratifiers as well. Another
research design is to explain the variance in compliance among treaty parties only
(Bernhagen 2008; Dai 2007) which facilitates modeling pressures to violate or to comply,
but cannot address the treaty’s impact relative to non-state parties. Alost all studies of the
influence of treaties on state behavior encounter serious issues of endogeneity and
selection, both with respect to the provisions of the treaty and with respect to ratification.
Since treaties exist and are written for specific purposes, it is hard to know how much
causal weight to attribute to the treaty or the underlying purpose. Ratification is quite
obviously not random either. Methods exist to address endogeneity and selection, but
they involve trade-offs and are highly imperfect (Simmons & Hopkins 2005; von Stein
2005).
Political science research on treaty violation and compliance has been a
tremendously productive area of research over the past decade. The growth has been
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mainly on the empirical side; the debate about meta-theoretical orientations has subsided
(compare Simmons 1998). Scholars are less concerned to affix a label their approach
(realist, Kantian liberalist, liberal institutionalist, constructivist, democratic process
school, legal process school, enforcement school managerial school, transformationalist
school to name a few from the1990s), than they are to make a coherent argument and to
test specific mechanisms. Research has become decided more quantitative than it was a
decade ago, especially in the area of human rights. Thanks to the systematic efforts of
governmental and non-governmental international organizations, government agencies
and teams of scholars, the data now available to assess compliance is far more extensive
and informative than it was only a few years ago. Controversies and lacunae obviously
still remain, but international and comparative politics scholars, sometimes in coauthorship with legal scholars, have significantly advanced the study of the politics of
treaty compliance in recent years.

II. Theoretical Approaches to Treaty Violation and Compliance
One of the most gratifying aspects about the research on international law and
international relations is that debates over meta-theoretical orientations have become
muted in the interest of going after genuine puzzles. Long standing theoretical traditions
continue to inform research, and to some extent realism inspires the null hypothesis of
choice. But today’s realists are more likely to stress international law’s
epiphenomenalism rather than its utterly irrelevance to international politics (Downs et al
1996; Goldsmith & Posner 2005). Moreover, some realists at least acknowledge the
possibility that international law might influence state behavior – even in wartime – by
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theorizing and testing for its possible influence in their research (Valentino et al 2006).
The “irrelevance” of international law to international politics no longer has the status of
a self-evident truth among realist theorists.
The dominant view in international relations – shared by a broad range of scholars
working in a rationalist tradition – recognizes that agreements that cannot be enforced by
a third party must in some sense be “self-enforcing.” A self-enforcing agreement is one in
which two or more parties adhere to the agreement as long as each gains more from
continuing the agreement than from abrogating it. The agreement is “enforced” by the
parties themselves by shutting down or reducing that future flow of benefits, not by third
party sanctions. Reciprocity and reputation are the key enforcement mechanisms. Robert
Keohane’s early theories of compliance with international regimes followed this logic.
Governments complied with their agreements for “reasons of reputation, as well as fear
of retaliation and concern about the effects of precedents” (Keohane 1984). As long as
the parties expect the treaty to provide benefits that extend long enough into the future
(the rate of future discount is low) self-interest can result in a high degree of compliance.
There are limits of course to the possibilities for fashioning self-enforcing
agreements among states. There may also be limits to the ability of reputational
considerations to support self-enforcing agreements across unrelated issue areas, where
behavior is difficult to observe, and within communities in which future interactions are
sparse or not very highly valued (Downs & Jones 2002). Moreover, the ability of actors
to regulate the exact message they want others to infer from their behavior may be
limited, as governments often cultivate multiple reputations (Keohane 1997). In trade,
for example, a government may want to cultivate a domestic reputation for
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responsiveness to constituency interests but an international reputation for
cooperativeness. Finally, “reputational sanctions”, like any other kind of sanction, may be
sub-optimal if the community does not find a way to overcome collective action
problems in its supply (Guzmán 2008). Since “enforcement” depends largely on
reciprocity, this framework is useful for explaining stable trade agreements (Goldstein et
al 2007) and some aspects of the laws of war, where militaries risk retaliation in kind
(Morrow 2007). It is also suitable for analyzing obligations whose violation might
provoke negative market reactions, as is plausible in the area of monetary affairs and
investment (Simmons 2000).
Theories of self-enforcing agreements are related conceptually to theories of
international law as an effort to bolster the credibility of a commitment. The assumption
of credible commitment theory is that many states are unable to enjoy the “joint gains”
implied by international agreements precisely because their potential partners do not
know if they will carry them out. Incentives to misrepresent true intentions aggravate the
contracting problem. Almost all theories of credible commitments rest on the assumption
of time-inconsistent preferences: it may be rational in time t to promise to behave
according to an agreement, but in time t+1 it is likely that one or both parties will face
incentives to renege. International treaties are sometimes analyzed as a device for
enhancing credibility in order to enjoy the very real gains from cooperation that motivate
contracting in the first place.
The essential feature of credible commitments theory is that states must be willing
to pay a non-trivial cost in order to participate in the agreement. It is precisely the
willingness to bear these costs that makes the agreement more credible than it would
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otherwise be. Two kinds of costs are distinguished in the literature: ex ante (or “sunk”)
costs that have the effect of credibly distinguishing a sincere government from an
opportunistic one; and ex post costs that are paid if a violation takes place (Fearon 1997).
High ex ante costs send a credible signal of intentions: no rational government would pay
a high “down-payment” on a cooperative enterprise if they did not intend to carry it out.
When a government pays high ex ante costs, other parties reasonably conclude that this
type of government will follow through with its agreement. High ex ante costs in effect
screen governments by type, revealing their true nature.
Signaling models of international treaty making are becoming quite common in
the literature of the politics of international law. One difference between treaties and
other kinds of agreements is that they have to be formally ratified, and in most countries
these formal procedures require legislative majorities (sometimes super-majorities)
(Martin 2000). Lisa Martin demonstrates theoretically and empirically the significance of
the signaling power of treaties by showing that that United States presidents typically
choose treaties rather than executive agreements for “high-value” international
agreements. She argues that higher cost treaty ratification is useful to assure other
countries that the United States intends to comply (Martin 2005). Similarly, in their
research on alliance agreements, Andrew Long and co-authors argue that because of the
up-front cost of negotiating and ratifying formal alliance agreements (compared,
presumably to mere political agreements), these constitute credible commitments about a
state’s intent to maintain peaceful relationships among the contracting parties (Long et al
2007).
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Signaling models predict treaty compliance, but they do not explain it. Committed
“types” are likely to pay the price for ratification, while uncommitted types are not.
When it is politically costly, treaty ratification functions as a separating equilibrium, in
which only the committed types are likely to pay the steep political costs of ratification.
Successful signaling can enhance stable reciprocity (Morrow 2007), but signaling models
per se do not explain why certain states are more “committed types” in the first place.
Costs paid ex post work in a different way, and more closely resemble the logic of
self-enforcing agreements discussed above. If ex ante costs can screen, then ex post costs
can (theoretically) constrain. Ex post costs are simply the consequences of noncompliance, which can range from trivial to monumental. When ex post costs are high
enough, they can effectively change a government’s interest in compliance. High ex ost
costs encourage other parties to reduce their assessment of the likelihood of defection,
increasing the range of agreements with which the parties have an incentive to comply.
Several scholars have argued that agreements that contain arbitration, prosecution or
dispute settlement mechanisms are efforts to make commitments more credible by
ramping up ex post costs. Examples include the International Criminal Court (Simmons
& Danner 2010), bilateral investment treaties (Elkins et al 2006) and the more
institutionalized provisions of some alliance pacts (Long et al 2007).
Most treaties do not of course have strong external enforcement mechanisms. In
that case, why are treaties especially useful tools for credible commitment-making?
Some scholars insist that there is something about a legal commitment that inherently
raises ex post costs in the event of rule violation. Andrew Guzman for example writes
that treaties “represent the complete pledge of a nation’s reputational capital” (Guzman
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2002; see also Schachter 1991). This special quality of treaties may be due to the fact that
they are embedded in a broader system of socially constructed interstate rule-making,
normatively linked by the principle of pacta sunt servanda – the idea that agreements of a
legally obligatory nature must be observed. Violating a legal agreement, in this view,
provides information on both the government’s attitude toward the contents of the treaty
(the specific rule) and respect for law itself (the broader set of principles in which the rule
is embedded). Note however, that for these reputational mechanisms to work, there must
be widespread social agreement that law creates more serious obligations than other
kinds of agreements, a point stressed by constructivist scholars. Arguably, treaties also
allow for a more complete reputational commitment because of their capacity for clarity.
Precision reduces the scope for plausible deniability of violation by narrowing the range
of reasonable interpretation. In James Morrow’s rationalist interpretation of the laws of
war, the relative precision of treaty arrangements supports reciprocity between warring
states by clarifying prescribed and proscribed behaviors and limiting the permitted range
of response to violation (Morrow 2007). For these reasons, violating a treaty is often
asserted to have more serious reputational consequences than reneging on a political
commitment, ceteris paribus.
These are reasonable arguments, but they rest on a very important assumption
about the elevated social status of law. While some international legal scholars may take
this as an article of faith, hard-headed political scientists are now trying to assemble
evidence that this is plausible. Michael Tomz uses surveys laced with experiments that
are designed to cue respondents that a particular act violates an international legal
obligation, and attempts to assess the effect of this “cue” on respondents’ attitudes about
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that country and the actions it has taken. His survey evidence suggests that respondents
are much more likely to oppose policies when they are told they violates international
law. The evidence also suggests that international legal agreements raise expectations
about compliance (Tomz 2008). We should be cautious about jumping to conclusions
based on such survey evidence; surveys about mass preferences do not translate easily
into electoral pressures, and even elite surveys can be attacked for problems with eternal
validity. But Tomz’s evidence does suggest that a legal commitment enhances the
reputational mechanism and may trigger audience costs that have rested for the most part
on assertion.
The notion that international legal commitments engage domestic audiences has
reoriented some of the theoretical literature toward domestic and comparative politics.
Xinyuan Dai has developed a domestic theory of compliance that depends on new policy
information generated by the often toothless international institutions legal agreements
sometimes create. Dai theorizes that compliance with international agreements is
enhanced through new information, generated by treaty bodies and monitoring systems,
that inform and empower domestic voters to punish governments for actions of which
they disapprove (Dai 2007). When a potential pro-compliance constituency is large
(which is not always the case, even in democratic polities), and when an international
agreement sheds significant new information on the government’s record of compliance,
a government will have strong electoral reasons not to violate international agreements.
Dai’s theory sheds light on why it is that liberal democracies are often better treaty
compliers: they are populated by large numbers and dense networks of citizens with
extensive interests in predictable and harmonious transnational relationships (Gaubatz
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1996; Slaughter 1995). But to the extent that the electoral mechanism is blunted or anticompliance groups dominate electoral politics the pressure on states to comply will
diminish.
The above theories flow largely from rational models of the pursuit of material
interests or office seeking, as posited by the analyst. Another branch of theorizing treaty
behavior emphasizes a more subjectivist logic and involves not merely changing
incentives, but changing minds. As alluded to in our discussion of the special status of
law, constructivists tend to view treaties as more than contracts; they embody norms
which reflect the social meanings and purposes of their propagators. Rules and norms are
important because they “condition actors' self-understandings, references, and
behavior..." (Reus-Smit 2004).. As such, they become a key focal point for discursive
struggles over legitimate political agency and action and critical resources in the
international politics of legitimacy.
International law has a special place in the array of social norms, some
constructivists argue, because it shapes the justificatory politics that ultimate inform
official actions. International law comprises a particular kind of discourse based o the
language of state sovereignty, justification, and obligation rather than power alone as
reasons for taking certain actions and not others. In this perspective, the nature of
discourse has a tremendous influence on behavior. Christian Reus-Smit goes so far as to
suggest that, "...legal right is as much a power resource as guns and money, and juridical
sovereignty, grounded in the legal norms of international society, is becoming a key
determinant of state power" (Reus-Smit 2004). International politics is a struggle to
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define symbols of meaning; controversies surrounding international law are a
manifestation of those struggles.
If discourse and ideas inform politics, then much of the compliance is explicable
in terms of what actors come to believe and value. Compliance with rules can be
enhanced through efforts at socialization, or what Kathryn Sikkink and Thomas Risse
define as the process by which principled ideas become broadly accepted norms. Once
they are internalized, these norms can lead to changes in interests, values and even
identities, which in turn ultimately shape state behavior (Risse-Kappen et al 1999).
Compliance is enhanced in this view when actors become socialized to comply.
Socialization can mean three kinds of processes in this literature. In a crude sense, actors
(state elites) can be “socialized” through a system of rewards and punishments
(Schimmelfennig 2005). Some people prefer to call this coercion, or maybe
conditioning. This form of socialization shades into incentive-based inducements
discussed above. More subtly, actors can be encouraged through various cues indicative
of social acceptance or approbation to bring their practices in line with international
standards. Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks refer to this as a process of acculturation by
which they mean the "general process by which actors adopt the beliefs and behavioral
patterns of the surrounding culture" (Goodman & Jinks 2004). Acculturation includes a
number of micro-processes such as mimicry, status maximization, and identification that
are often at the heart of world institutionalist theories common in sociology (Finnemore
1996). This is compliance through conformity: social group tend to generate varying
degrees of cognitive and social pressures, real or imagined, to bring behavior in
alignment with that of peers. Acculturation involves "social costs" such as shaming or
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shunning as distinct from the more material costs associated with overt coercion. These
pressures may lead to superficial compliance with international norms as reflected in
treaty obligations, not necessarily the internationalization of norms as deeply held values
(Strang & Chang 1993).
Acculturation can be contrasted with a more fundamental form of socialization,
often referred to in the literature as normative persuasion. Persuasion depends on the
power of argumentation and deliberation as distinct modes of social interaction which
when successful changes what an actor values and sometimes even his or her very
identity (Johnston 2001; Risse 2000). Jeffrey Checkel defines persuasion as "a social
process of interaction that involves changing attitudes about cause and effect in the
absence of overt coercion" (Checkel 2001). He argues that persuasion is more likely to
play an important role in explaining compliance behavior when elites do not have deeply
held priors, and they are therefore open to new ways of thinking about issues.
The socialization literature theorizes the diffusion of norms over time and space,
but it is still puzzling as to why some norms seem to be internalized and complied with
more than others. Some scholars argue that the quality of the norm itself matters.
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink propose that human rights norms that are the most
universal in nature – those protecting innocent women and children – are the most widely
held and have a special compliance pull (see also Hawkins 2004; Keck & Sikkink 1998).
In his examination of arms control treaties during the interwar years, Jeffry Legro builds
on the earlier insights of legal scholars Thomas Franck and Louis Henkin (Franck 1990;
Henkin 1995) when he argues that qualities such as norm specificity, durability, and
concordance improve prospects for compliance (Legro 1997). Others argue that norms
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will be more or less influential depending on how they mesh with domestic norms and
institutions (Checkel 2001). The idea that mass publics might play a role in the
socialization of governments to comply with their international agreements is central to
Frank Schimmelfennig’s research on the compliance of Eastern Europe with the
governing standards of the West (Schimmelfennig 2005).
Whether because of their persuasive function or their information providing
function (or both) constructivists often agree with rational theorist that pressures applied
by (often transnational) civil society tend to pressure or persuade governments to comply
with international legal standards and obligation. Sally Merry’s transnational
ethnography of the role of transnational actors provides a rich description of how the
process of persuasion and communication operates transnationally (Merry 2006).
Transnational human rights ideas become part of local social movements and local legal
consciousness through the work of individuals who have one authentic foot in the local
culture and the other in the transnational world of United Nations conferences, meetings
and workshops. These individuals play a crucial role Merry’s felicitous phrase in
“translating global principles into the local vernacular” (Merry 2006). This is a two-way
form of communication, often supporting new ideas and identities at the local levels but
also educating the global community about the local realities on the ground.
Ideational theories have also been advanced linking democratic forms of domestic
governance to better international law compliance. The normative argument for better
treaty performance from more democratic governments has been framed in terms of
“universal democratic norms for reconciling competing values and interests” (Dixon
1994) which draws from the broader literature in international relations on normative
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explanations for the democratic peace. Democracies rest on a robust form of
constitutionalism, which puts law at the heart of public legitimacy, and subjects all forms
of public authority to principled limitations on the exercise of power. Compliance with
international treaty obligations in this view is consonant with compliance with domestic
constitutional obligations; governments who are willing to recognize the latter are
generally more willing to comply with the former (Gaubatz 1996). In this view, a shared
identity as a democratic state based on the rule of law renders compliance with
international legal obligations the more appropriate policy choice.
Despite the temptation to contrast so-called “ideational” theories with
“rationalist” ones, the complementarities are striking. Like rationalists, constructivists
recognize that reputation surely matters to governments and their constituencies, but
reputational concerns themselves are hardly exogenously given constructs; they are the
result of intense socialization among state elites within a particular region(Lutz &
Sikkink 2000). Game theorists posit such concepts as “common conjectures” that
facilitate reciprocation, but what are common conjectures but commonly shared
assumptions about certain basic principles or beliefs about how the “game” should be
played (Morrow 2007)? Habermasian theories of communicative action have a
sophisticated continental appeal (Risse 2000), but they often lead to analyses that bear a
strong resemblance to what the Chayes in their more “managerial” style know
colloquially as “jawboning” (Chayes & Chayes 1993). Theorists of law compliance have
been borrowing from one another’s conceptual toolkits for years. That few any longer
feel obliged to declare an exclusive theoretical affiliation has largely promoted theoretical
rigor, not undercut it.
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II. Treaty Compliance - Empirical Studies by Issue Area
The recent growth in research on international law violation and compliance has
been largely in the area of empirical research. Scholars, non-governmental organizations
and governmental agencies are beginning systematically to collect and publish
information that can help test hypotheses about the conditions under which governments
comply with or violate their international treaty obligations. I have selected four quite
different issue to review these developments: war fighting, peace and security
(traditionally dominated by realist theories); trade and commercial relationships
(traditionally the domain of theories of reciprocity and self-enforcing agreements);
environment protection (typically framed in terms of capacity issues and information
availability) and international human rights agreement (an issue in which constructivist
theories have traditionally had the strongest influence). Most but not all of these studies
are quantitative, reflecting the flow of recently published research

Warfighting, Peace and Security
International legal agreements have played a huge role in relationships between
states involving war, peace and security. Alliances, peace agreements and terrotiral
boundaries are all typically governed by treaties, as are the laws of war-fighting
themselves. The theoretical shift from a realist lens to that of credible commitments
suggests why law pervades issues of national security: these are critical problems that are
hard to solve unless costly commitments to comply are made. Most of the literature in
this area reflects the idea that treaties help states signal a serious intent to comply with
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agreements, marking a shift in security studies in the past decade to finally take these
agreements seriously.
The recent alliance literature exemplifies this approach. Formal alliances have
generally been theorized as signals of a state’s intent to intervene militarily under certain
conditions should war erupt (Morrow 1994). As such, they are generally signed with the
expectation that they will be complied with in case of war. Research by Ashley Leeds
and Burcu Savun based on data they collected for the Alliance Treaty Obligations and
Provisions (ATOP) project suggests that most alliances are honored most of the time; but
about 34% of alliance treaties for the past two centuries have ended in opportunistic
violation (Leeds & Savun 2007) It is hard to know whether this is a “high” noncompliance or not (compared to what?) but given the importance of alliances to vital
national security interests, one might suppose this figure represents a fairly good rate of
non-abrogration. Some research suggests that states honor their alliance commitments as
a way to preserve their reputation as a good ally into the future. Douglas Gibler produces
evidence that governments (note: not “states”) that abrogate their alliances are much less
likely to be able to negotiate alliance relationships for the rest of their terms, making it
much harder to deter potential aggressors (Gibler 2008). Alliance treaties tend to be
“self-enforcing agreements” in that the ex post consequences of abrogation entail very
real risks to national security into the future. Consistent with this view, Leeds and Savun
found that the major condition under which states abrogate alliance treaties is when they
experience a drastic change in circumstances from those prevailing when the treaty was
ratified. They found that violation was more than twice as likely when there was a
significant change in relative international power of one or both of the parties, a
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significant change in domestic political institutions or the formation of a new outside
alliance since the original alliance was formed. While most alliance treaties are in fact
honored, they do not create legal straightjackets that interfere with new definitions of
what is in a state’s security interest. (Leeds & Savun 2007).
The concept of audience costs has also been useful for understanding how formal
agreements can influence the duration of peace. After years of war and mistrust,
agreements to make peace are difficult to make credible. Treaties here again play an
important role by raising ex post international audience costs as well as by signaling
intentions ex ante. They can also reduce uncertainty about actions and intentions; thus
helping to reduce belligerents’ incentives to rekindle their conflict. Virginia Page
Fortna’s research suggests there is some empirical basis for viewing peace agreements in
this way. She finds that “stronger” peace agreements – by which she means ones that
raise the costs of reneging by creating clear demilitarized zones, joint monitoring
commissions, and third party guarantees – lead to more a durable peace (Fortna 2003).
Similarly, Michaela Mattes examines the role of “conciliatory” agreements in the
resolution of territorial disputes, and finds that those that reduce uncertainty and raise
costs ex post are likely to reduce the risk that disputing parties will resort to militarized
conflicts (Mattes 2008) But these cases raise the problem of the endogeneity of treaties.
It is highly likely that governments design “strong” and/or “conciliatory” agreements
when they are especially motivated to try and settle the dispute. If so, is it the agreement
or the underlying motivation to settle that drives the findings?
Agreements that constrain military operations in the heat of battle present the
most significant challenges for international treaties. When independent state survival
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may be at stake, we have the most stringent test possible for the power of treaty
agreements to constrain state behavior. The laws of war fighting are a good example.
They embody norms to protected civilians and cultural property, to require decent
treatment of prisoners, to medically treat wounded enemies, and so forth. Not only are
there severe temptations to defect if banned practices might mean a military advantage;
there is also the problem that atrocities of various kinds can be committed by individual
soldiers even when it is against the policy of their government.
The protection of civilians may be the most difficult problem of all. Benjamin
Valentino and his co-authors test the proposition that international treaties on the laws of
war during the twentieth century (1900-2003) has had a significant impact on the rates at
which the militaries of warring state parties “intentionally” kill civilians (Valentino et al
2006). For each of 148 international conflicts of the past century, Valentino et al coded
whether the parties had ratified the 1899 Hague Convention, the 1907 Hague Convention,
the 1949 Geneva Convention, and the Geneva Convention Protocols of 1977. They
found that the intentional killing of civilians was correlated with the strategy chosen to
prosecute the war, but not influenced at all by ratification of the relevant treaty for the
time period under question. They conclude that “international law provides little
protection for civilian populations in times of war. Whatever pressures toward restraint
these treaties may exert on their signatories appear to be overwhelmed by the strategic
incentives that combatants face to prevail and limit the costs of war to their own citizens”
(Valentino et al 2006). However, much more could be done to understand the indirect
influence of these treaties on war fighting, including their possible influence on the
choice of a strategy itself. If ratifiers are much less willing to lay siege to an enemy
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causing the starvation of its population, there is some risk that the effect of the legal norm
is being masked by the choice of strategy.
An even more ambitious effort to understand the dynamics of the laws of war is
James Morrow’s study of eight different sub-issue areas, including aerial bombardment,
armistice/ceasefire, chemical and biological weapons, treatment of civilians, protection of
cultural property, conduct on the high seas, treatment of prisoners of war, and treatment
of the wounded (Morrow 2007). Using different data and methods, Morrow does to some
extent corroborate the findings of Valentino et al, in that he finds the treatment of civilian
populations to be especially problematic in war time. This is hardly the end of the story
however. Morrow draws on signaling theory to argue that “Treaties are a public signal
that a state accepts a standard by ratifying it, and so will live up to the standard of that
treaty if it goes to war…Ratification by both sides is necessary for them to understand
that they intend to honor that standard to the best of their ability” (Morrow 2007).
Morrow is not explicit about why such a signal would be credible to an adversary,
although he does suggest that in a democratic setting, audience costs help to hold
governments to their international commitments. The model he proposes allows for an
indirect role for treaty ratification: treaties clarify what is, and what is not acceptable
behavior, which allows adversaries in war more precisely to respond to violations in kind.
This reciprocity, in turn, is associated with higher levels of compliance with the laws of
war. Morrow’s key finding is that a state is more likely to violate the laws of war
reciprocally when it is clear the adversary has done so; when both have ratified the
relevant treaty, and when both of these conditions hold (a triple interaction term). Merely
to have ratified does not produce better compliance, but by facilitating reciprocity, he
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argues the treaties have made important if indirect contributions to the somewhat more
humane conduct of war.
Arguments for treaty compliance based on legal principles are by nature rare in
the security area. As we have seen, theories of compliance or violation of international
agreements in the security area tend to be based on arguments about reciprocity, the
ability to send credible signals, or the ex post costs associated with reneging. It is
therefore quite refreshing to consider the results of a study by Judith Kelley on states’
(un)willingness to renege on their formal legal commitments to the International Criminal
Court (Kelley 2007). Kelley asks, why do states live up to their legal obligations to
cooperate with the ICC, especially in the face pressures any realist might assume would
cause them to violate? Between 2002 and 2006, the United States applied very tangible
forms of pressure – from diplomatic up to and including the threat of withdrawing
military aid – to countries that refused to sign a mutual non-surrender agreement with the
US. These agreements created bilateral obligations not to surrender one another’s
nationals to the ICC. The problem, however, is that such agreements conflict with the
legal obligation any ratifier of the ICC statutes would have to cooperate with that
institution. It is a difficult dilemma: should a state party live up to its ICC obligations
and risk US sanctions, or should they stand up to the US, and stand by the ICC?
Kelley argues that despite the threats of the United States, some states resisted for
very principled reasons. Some states had a strong affinity for the purposes of the ICC.
She presents evidence from a cross sectional probit that democracies, the “like-minded
countries” (the hard-core IC supporters during the negotiations) and states with sterling
human rights records tended to ratify the ICC statutes. But even more revealing, states
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with a strong commitment to the rule of law refused to go back on their ICC
commitments. The interaction of a strong commitment to the rule of law and a previous
ratification was a strong predictor (again, in a cross-sectional probit model) that a state
would refuse to ratify a mutual non-surrender agreement with the United States. Four
case studies – Botswana, Costa Rica, Estonia and Australia – provide the context for
these findings. While Botswana reneged, all of the other three rebuffed the US, stuck
with the ICC, and cited the importance of consistency with their prior legal obligations as
the primary reason. Kelley concludes that “...international agreements can be effective
across a broad spectrum of issue areas, not just in cases with clearly identified material
payoffs of iterated cooperation” (Kelley 2007). She argues that a strong commitment to
the rule of law highly conditions any general claims about the overall “compliance pull”
of treaties generally. Consistent with normative theories of behavior, the “tug” is
strongest for those polities that place the highest value on the rule of law.
While all of the above studies center on the question of first order compliance –
or compliance with the substantive provisions of a treaty arrangement – growing attention
has been given recently to the question of second order compliance – or compliance with
the authoritative ruling of a third party when the substantive rules are under dispute.
Why comply with the decisions of international tribunals, especially when a crucial
national security issue is at stake? The answer that some scholars have advanced is an
interesting mix of rational decisionmaking under normative constraints. Tribunals are
theorized as an authoritative embodiment of the will of the international community. To
comply with their decisions is often a rational strategy because of how it will be
interpreted by other states. Drawing on theories of reputation and the interpretation of
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signals, and assuming there are important gains to be had from settlement, complying
with the decisions of international tribunals is a chance for a “losing” disputant to make a
territorial concession to an adversary that it would be difficult to make politically in the
absence of the third party authoritative decision .(Allee & Huth 2006; Simmons 2002).
Sara Mitchell and Paul Hensel use a selection model to demonstrate empirically that
governments are more likely to comply with the decisions of an authoritative third party
than they are with an agreement reached on their own (Mitchell & Hensel 2007). These
findings illuminate how the legal context potentially shapes the meaning of actions:
deferring to legal authority signals a law abiding character, while deferring to an
adversary signals nothing but weakness. This is a powerful demonstration of the need to
marry rational accounts with subjective understandings of behavior.

Trade Liberalization
A surprisingly small amount of research has been done on compliance with
international trade treaties. Indeed, the literature does not focus so much on compliance
or violation as on the effectiveness of the international trade regime to stimulate trade
between nations. This may speak to the consequences of international law, but not
specifically to the conditions under which state parties comply with or violate their treaty
obligations. It is likely that effectiveness is related to compliance – one reason states
have been willing to liberalize their trade policies is likely due to the reciprocal
compliance of other states – but it is not a direct test of the behavioral proposition that
governments comply with their agreements in this area. After all, governments could be
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in complete compliance with their agreements, but if the agreements require them to do
very little, the effect on trade volumes and directions could be expected to be modest.
In contrast to the security area, political and legal analysts have tended to assume
that there is a very high degree of compliance with most international commercial law.
In the area of trade, the role of reciprocity is thought to be so strong that there is no
realistic option to cooperation; no state would want to risk withdrawal from the network
of liberalizing treaties that (presumably) have done so much to further market integration
in goods and services over the past several decades. Some have cited the tremendous
reductions in tariff rates over the past few decades, and concluded that “in the case of
tariff cuts, implementation is compliance” (McNamara 2004). Others have looked to the
operation of the World Trade Organization’s Dispute Settlement Mechanism, and are
satisfied that panel decisions are complied with some 90 per cent of the time (Wilson
2007). But the truth of the matter is that political scientists have spent much more time
researching trade bargaining within WTO institutions than compliance per se (Busch &
Reinhardt 2003; Guzman & Simmons 2002). We know surprisingly little about actual
compliance with international trade law.
Systematic research on compliance with international trade law is much more
difficult than one would expect. A convincing dataset on compliance with treaty law in
this area would be a mind-boggling endeavor, even if one were to focus only on the WTO
and set aside the large number of regional agreements governing trade relationships.
Unlike the study of international humanitarian law, there is no obvious unit of analysis
such as “warring dyad” on which to focus research. Trade policies are implemented on
thousands of products, and in the absence of authoritative rulings, it is hard to know
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which policies are consistent with treaty obligations and which are not. It might be
possible to piece together a picture of allegations of non-compliance from national
sources, as Christina Davis has done in her forthcoming study of trade between the
United States, Japan, and Europe, but Davis – appropriately – uses such data as an
indicator of “potential disputes” and not treaty violations (Davis forthcoming). It might
also be possible to create a “compliance” database based on reports by the secretariat
pursuant to the periodic Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). But the WTO is
pretty clear that these reports are not determinations of legal compliance with treaty
obligations (see Annex III of the Marrakesh Agreement of 1994).
The easiest way to think about compliance with international trade law is to take
Kathleen McNamara’s suggestion and accept the assertion that effectiveness is a good
approximation of compliance. If states are complying with their obligations under the
GATT/WTO, we might expect the reduction of trade barriers and growth in trade among
GATT/WTO members. Using a standard gravity model as his baseline, Andrew Rose
found however that countries that had joined the GATT or WTO had trade patterns that
were largely indistinguishable from those that had not (Rose 2004). This finding was
immediately criticized by researchers using more fine-grained data and who used a less
formalistic definition of “membership.” Judith Goldstein and her co-authors argued that
it was important to look at effective participation in the regime in order to determine its
effects (Goldstein et al 2007). When territories, dependencies, and newly independent
countries are included, they argue, there is in fact a significant and positive effect of
“joining”, especially among the advanced industrialized economies, but also between
these and the developing countries. They argue that the rules of the regime have served
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to support clear expectations of reciprocity, limit tit-for-tat protectionist behaviors, and to
lock-in liberal policies on future governments of participating states. The implication of
this research is that there was “enough” compliance with the various treaty obligations to
make a marked positive impact on bilateral trade. Despite the sophistication of the data
and the quantitative model, neither Rose nor Goldstein et al account for the endogeneity
of joining these trade agreements in the first place. There is a significant literature which
discusses the impact of alliances and security arrangements on trade (Gowa 1994). If
these non-economic factors explain both the likelihood of a trade agreement and also has
an independent effect on trade itself, any relationship between participation in trade
agreements and trade outcomes could be spurious.
A second stream of research attempts to leverage information on the different
ways in which states implement their “protectionist” trade policies. Chad Bown
distinguishes instances in which countries have implemented “legal” protection under the
safeguards provisions (found in their notifications under the GATT’s Articles XIX and
XXVIII) from instances in which they went ahead with illegal measures that in fact
eventually were referred to the GATT/WTO dispute settlement process (Bown 2004).
Bown finds that the ability to retaliate and especially the ability to alter the terms of trade
in one’s own favor has a significant impact on the willingness simply to violate the
agreement – and let the trade partners complain. Governments are much more likely to
appeal to “legal” protection under the safeguards clause if they are unable to influence the
terms of trade in their favor through protection. Thus the “bilateral imbalance of power”
is one of the main factors behind bald violations. These results coincide with Keisuke’s
description of trade disputes between the United States in Japan. He argues Japan has
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been quite reluctant to retaliate – even legally – when the United States institutes trade
policies that violate GATT/WTO rules (Iida 2006).
Despite the fact that trade agreements are generally highly likely to be “selfenforcing” as discussed above, a good deal of research has focused on the dispute
settlement mechanism of the GATT/WTO. The odd fact on which there seems to be a
good deal of consensus is that 90 of all adopted decisions of WTO involve a finding of a
violation, and in practically every case the violator complies with the decision of the
panel (Wilson 2007). Why such a high compliance rate, especially given that many of
these cases that escalate to a formal panel decision are politically “hard” cases to solve
(Davis forthcoming; Guzman & Simmons 2002)?
Two answers can be found in the literature. One emphasizes that defiance of
authoritative decisions of third parties have an even stronger negative impact on a
country’s reputation than non-compliance with the original agreement. As discussed
above in the context of territorial concessions, third party decisions represent in some
sense the will of the international community; they clarify the nature of the violation and
what steps are necessary to correct it. In a world of constructed reputations, continuing to
violate a rule in the face of an authoritative decision sends a strong signal that that
particular state (or perhaps government) is not a trustworthy trade partner. Daniel Kono’s
study of how trade dispute settlement mechanisms facilitate reciprocity provides a good
empirical example of this claim (Kono 2007). He argues that defiance of WTO decisions
inflicts too heavy a reputational toll. Christina Davis’s model further suggests that
governments may be willing to comply with the WTO panel decisions because with an
unfavorable decision in hand, they can tell their domestic producers they did their best to
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defend their interests (Davis forthcoming). Once again, researchers are finding that it is
much more palatable and strategically sensible to concede to legal authority than to the
demands of a trade partner.
Finally, there is a lively debate in the trade compliance literature about the role
that institutional design plays in eliciting deeper levels of cooperation. On the one hand,
some scholars appeal to the logic of hands tying and argue that tight rules that credibly
impose costs elicit better compliance Jide Nzelibe argues in the context of WTO
enforcement that the credible threat of inflicting serious political costs on a violating state
through retaliation is a way to mobilize “powerful export groups in the scofflaw state
against protectionist policies” (Nzelibe 2005). By contrast, some scholars argue that
flexibility is the key to deeper cooperation (Rosendorff 2005). The idea here is that states
will agree to deeper commitments in the first place if they know there are some
conditions under which these commitments can be relaxed. Jeffrey Kucik and Eric
Reinhardt produce some evidence for the flexibility proposition by looking at the
prevalence of domestic anti-dumping mechanisms (which provide the “flexibility”) and
the likelihood that a country will join the WTO and lower its tariff rates once it does
(Kucik & Reinhardt 2008). Kucik and Reinhardt have a clever way to control for the
endogeneity of domestic anti-dumping mechanisms: by looking at whether a country has
been a target of others’ anti-dumping rules, and by looking at the regional density of antidumping rules, which, they argue, is likely to elicit the use of such rules by other
countries in the region. They find that flexibility defined this way does indeed improve
trade cooperation: states with domestic anti-dumping mechanisms were more likely to
join and more likely to make deeper concessions on tariffs. In this case anyway, it
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appears that safeguards encourage deeper cooperation. It may be that flexible treaties
elicit better compliance, precisely because they encourage states to make deeper
commitments in the first place.

International Environmental Regulation
The study of compliance with international environmental treaties got its start in
the 1990s with a rich case study literature. Ronald Mitchell was one of the first political
scientists to explore the impact of the design of international environmental institutions
on the incentives actors have to pollute the natural environment, with his often cited
study of intentional oil pollution at sea (Mitchell 1994). His research – which showed
that transparency played a crucial role in compliance with anti-pollution rules – sparked
interest among international relations scholars in the possibility that and institutions could
indeed provide the tools to encourage states to comply with their international obligations
and private actors to refrain from environmental degradation. A series of very important
case study collections appeared within years. Some of the most influential were focused
on the question of treaty effectiveness and only incidentally on the issue of compliance
and violation (Victor et al 1998). Others were focused quite squarely on the compliance
issue, including a collection by Edith Brown Weiss and Harold K Jacobson. Their
volume put a number of issues on the table – including the crucial role of state capacity to
implement often complex regulatory agreements; the difficulties of constraining private
actors; the state of knowledge and science; and the use of positive and negative
inducements to encourage compliance (Weiss & Jacobson 1998). The theoretical
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orientation of the literature has not changed much in the long decade since these books
were published.
In contrast to the other issues areas discussed in this review, compliance with
international environmental law involves regulations that attempt to chance the behaviors
of private actors, in particular commercial entities. More than the other issue areas,
competitive factors can push toward treaty violation, as firms want to reduce costs and
the states in which they are domiciled often are prevailed on to aid and abet competitive
strategies. Compliance with certain international environmental agreements can be
expensive for industry, at least initially. Where violators can be excluded from certain
international “club goods”, however, compliance rates can be improved. Elizabeth
Desombre’s study of compliance in the international shipping industry provides a good
example (DeSombre 2006). She notes that despite the economic pressure to cut corners
and violate agreements, the ability of port states, international labor unions,
intergovernmental fishery organizations, and high-standard industry actors to exclude
violators associated with particular flags of convenience has helped to nudge some of the
worst polluters toward at least partial compliance.
Since environmental protection is a regulatory policy that involves a broad array
of non-governmental actors, it is not surprising that models stressing the civil society and
interest aggregation abound. Patrick Bernhagen proposes a model in which business
organization, structural strength and information asymmetries predict low compliance
with multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) in general, and the 1992 UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change in particular (Bernhagen 2008). Bernhagen
measures compliance in two ways: first, by a scale of elite perceptions of regime
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compliance are taken from the World Economic Forum’s 2000 Global Competitiveness
Report; and second by actual reductions in greenhouse gasses. With only 35 advanced
industrialized countries in the sample and a cross-sectional design (for the year 2000), it
is not surprising that the actual results of these tests are quite thin, especially since the
measures on the explanatory variables are very poor proxies. But Bernhagen does find
that greater participation by NGOs and corporatist forms of interest mediation contribute
to higher compliance, suggesting that participation by non-business civil society groups
can have a strong positive influence on compliance with MEAs (Bernhagen 2008; see
also Gulbrandsen & Andresen 2004).
Xinuan Dai’s work, discussed in the theoretical section above, is a sophisticated
example of the role that information provision plays in a domestic political context (Dai
2007). She has shown – logically and with empirical case study evidence – that when
international regimes generate new information about government compliance efforts,
groups with an interest in compliance stand a much better chance of holding their
government accountable. The key in Dai’s work is that new information allows for the
triggering of domestic accountability mechanisms, in contrast to the centralized
enforcement mechanisms discussed elsewhere. Empirically, Dai demonstrates that
compliance is greatest in countries that have very active domestic groups in the area
covered by the treaty. Specifically, Dai shows there is a clear correlation in the rankings
of the countries that are party to the 1985 Sulphur Protocol according to Eurobarometer
data on the level of domestic environmental activism mobilized around the acid rain issue
and subsequent compliance behavior. Information generated by the international
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institution provides the possibility for enhanced domestic accountability in her account
(Dai 2007).
As in other areas of compliance research, there has been a recent trend toward
quantitative work on compliance with environmental accords. One of the most notable
efforts to build a database containing a broad range of environmental “regimes” (clusters
of treaties in a specific issue area) is the recently available International Regimes
Database project directed by Oran Young and Michael Zürn (Young & Zürn 2006). This
was an ambitious project, some 15 years in the making, to get a thorough understanding
of how legal regimes are created, managed, change, and are complied with in the
environmental area. The investigators asked experts to answer specific (but highly
subjective) questions about particular regimes, or regime components, including
compliance The unit of analysis in this database is the regime or regime component
itself, rather than countries or country-years common in much of the quantitative
compliance literature. Some thirty environmental regimes – from the Antarctic Treaty to
the Tropical Timber Trade regime – were coded on a 5-point scale from “behavior
exceeds requirements” to “behavior does not confirm at all” (Breitmeier et al 2006). This
format facilitates comparison across a number of treaty obligations for the international
community as a whole. The disadvantage is that the data cannot be used to analyze the
compliance patterns of particular countries – with the exception of a few of the “most
important” (which are selected on an ad hoc basis by the expert doing the coding).
Moreover, the data are not arranged as a time series, making it challenging to explore
change over time. While “watershed” years are used to mark important changes within
regimes, the database is not designed for serious dynamic analyses. Finally, there is the
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problem of knowing what the experts are coding. They were given very clear
instructions on the criteria for making their judgments, but it is not clear what data the
expert coders based their judgments on. While the IRD is a good effort to collect
theoretical relevant information – of the kind for example that would address the claims
of constructivists as well as liberal institutionalists – it is difficult for outsiders to evaluate
what behaviors constitute compliance in this database.
Two books have come out of the IRD, written by the project directors (Breitmeier
2008; Breitmeier et al 2006). One of the main findings is that compliance with these
regimes is quite high generally, and especially among the “most important” states.
Furthermore, compliance has tended to increase after major watersheds, despite the fact
that the obligations in many of these regimes have deepened – evidence considered to run
contra to the ideas of George Downs and co-authors. Some effort is made to correlate
compliance with certain regime provisions, such as differentiable obligations, which the
researchers claim lowers rather than improves compliance, contra the expectations of
those who stress capacity limitations as a major cause of non-compliance with
environmental agreements. The problem, however, is that unless there is some way to
control for why these regime provisions were chosen in the first place, it is hard to
attribute a causal story to them.

Human Rights
The literature on violation of and compliance with international human rights
treaties has burgeoned and changed considerably over the past decade. Qualitative work
dominated the scene until relatively recently. Quantitative work now rivals traditional

34
qualitative approaches in terms of sheer numbers of studies. In this respect, the human
rights research has now – for better or worse – joined the mainstream of quantitative
social science, especially in the major political science journals. There is still room to
deploy mixed methods in book length studies, monographs and law reviews, but the
constraints on page numbers and the development of widely used datasets relating to
human rights practices has served to boost significantly the number of quantitative
studies in political science research.
Human rights as an issue area is quite different from all the areas reviewed above
in several critical respects. It is perhaps the least likely area to engage the interests or
attention of other states, who typically see the treatment of foreign citizens as peripheral
to their interests. It does not engage reciprocity in any significant way, weakening the
possibilities for mutually beneficial self-enforcing agreements. A number of scholars
have noted that functionalist theories based on joint gains and reciprocity are a very poor
fit for understanding compliance and violation in the human rights area (Simmons 2009).
It is certainly an area in which non-material issues, including human respect and dignity,
are at the forefront. Lacking the theoretical tools for understanding nuanced patterns of
violation and compliance in this area, traditional realists simply assert that “Most human
rights practices are explained by coercion or coincidence of interest” (Goldsmith &
Posner 2005).
More than any other issue area, human rights practices are difficult to understand
without a theory of normative acceptance. A large literature has developed that eschews
a strictly rational approach in favor of more normative drivers and subjectivist influences
on human rights behaviors. The foundational work related to norm adoption and
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compliance was that of Thomas Risse, Steven Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, who advanced
a “spiral model” for the adoption of international human rights norms. Their theory
posited repression, followed by the activation of domestic and transnational groups,
“tactical concessions” by governments to assuage complaints about repressive practices,
and eventually rule-compliant behavior. While they were not theorizing compliance with
international treaties specifically, this research had alerted political scientists to the
possibility that in some cases treaty ratification may be a tactical concession governments
make to assuage critics that a government is “committed” to decent human rights
practices (Risse-Kappen et al 1999). But once such tactical concessions have been made,
actors begin regularly to refer to human rights norms (e.g., treaties) to refer to or
comment on their own behavior. These theorists draw on theories of discourse, that
emphasize the power of persuasion, discussion and language to change ideas of what
constitutes appropriate behavior (Hawkins 2004). Having gained salience as a rule,
human rights norms may eventually come to be internalized, resulting ultimately in “ruleconsistent behavior.” In this view, treaty ratification may ultimately (though obviously
not necessarily) contribute to the internalization of higher human rights standards, as
governments begin to defend and define their actions – with ongoing persuasive efforts
by international, transnational, and domestic actors - on the basis of their provisions.
One of the earliest efforts to test for the effects of human rights treaties on state
behavior was Linda Camp-Keith’s study of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). Extending a model initially developed by Poe and Tate to
explain civil and political rights (Freedom House measures) and Gibney and Stohl’s
“personal integrity index,” Keith added ratification to the right hand side of the pooled
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time series to see if ratification had any independent effects on these outcomes. She
found none that withstood her multivariate analysis. Some states, evidently, were
continuing to violate norms such that it was not possible to detect an influence to the
ICCPR ratification on average. She speculated that her results were due to weak external
enforcement as well as “a serious domestic situation, such as civil war or domestic unrest,
that interferes with [governments’] ability to keep their commitment or that lessens their
willingness to keep their commitment" (Keith 1999).
More quantitative tests followed, covering a larger number of treaties, and
sparking debates not only among political scientists but among legal scholars as well.
One puzzle was why obviously repressive governments ratified human rights treaties at
all. James Vreeland argues that in the case of torture, governments are sometimes
making a tactical concession to their domestic political opponents, which explains why
ratification of the CAT is more common in repressive regimes that allow some degree of
political competition than in those that do not (Vreeland 2008). The fact that external
enforcement has been quite weak some scholars to view ratification as an expressive act
that does not signal any intent to comply with the contents of the treaty. Early work by
Oona Hathaway broke ranks with the assumptions of many legal scholars when she
found, using quantitative evidence, that countries that ratified the Convention Against
Torture, for example, were just as (perhaps more) likely to torture they citizens as
countries that had not ratified (Hathaway 2002).
Hathaway’s work was path-breaking for a number of reasons. It was one of the
first studies to do a careful job to research the exact nature of the behavior the treaty
addressed, and developed careful indicators for these behaviors based on the actual
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provisions in the treaties. She devised a “torture scale” and a “fair trials scale” both of
which are more appropriate for testing treaty compliance with the ICCPR and the CAT
than broad indicators such as Freedom House’s “Civil and Political Rights” that were
devised for completely different purposes. In a few cases, however, she confuses the
concepts of treaty compliance and violation with the concept of treaty effectiveness; for
example, the use of the number of women in parliament is more a measure of
effectiveness of rather than compliance with the Convention on the Political Rights of
Women. In one case there is a serious treaty obligation-data mismatch: the use of
politicide data to test for the impact of the Genocide Convention. But overall all, no
empirical paper has done more to begin a conversation about the empirical consequences
of ratification of human rights treaties than did Hathaway’s 2002 study.
Scholars inspired by theories originating in institutional sociology come to similar
conclusions as Hathaway’s through different mechanisms. Institutional sociology touts
the power of “world society” to generate and diffuse norms of behavior that mimic
accepted scripts of modernity – encouraging countries on the periphery to display
outward forms in conformity with the institutions and forms of leading states of the
western world – without internalizing the values behind these forms. The theory predicts
a “radical decoupling” of treaty commitments, which are said to be “expected” of all
modern states, from actual rights behaviors (Cole 2005; Wotipka & Ramirez 2008).
Emily Hafner-Burton and Kiyoteru Tsutsui consequently argue that ratification of human
rights treaties is not associated with better rights performance. The key explanatory
variable in their study is the number of human rights treaties a country has ratified among
the “core six” they select. There is little evidence that ratification of more treaties
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reduces political repression when modeled in this fashion, causing these authors to
conclude that ratification is little more than a “paradox of empty promises” (HafnerBurton & Tsutsui 2005).
This early quantitative work – which has been cited frequently in the political
science literature – suffers from a few weaknesses. First, there is the problem of
matching treaty obligations with indicators of compliance outcomes. Hathaway’s work in
this respect, as discussed above, was both pathbreaking and problematic. Certainly,
lumping the number of treaty ratifications together and expecting the more the merrier is
highly suspect. Studies that look at the number of treaties ratified as the key dependent
variable are likely to be picking up the ease of ratification in particular institutional
contexts, rather than a specific international legal commitment. Second, in common with
several studies in other issue areas, all of the early quantitative studies discussed above
treated treaty ratification as exogenous. But it can hardly be the case that states randomly
sort into ratifiers and non-ratifiers. Third, the early studies were designed only to detect
homogenous effects across all states alike. Despite acknowledging a complex social and
political world, the treaties are modeled as unmediated and their effects unconditional.
Practically no one who has done qualitative work in this area imagines such a
determinative or direct mechanism. Rather, they see treaties as tools for strategic or
normatively driven actors to change the politics of human rights compliance in specific
institutional contexts.
These issues became central to the next generation of quantitative human rights
research, which took off right around 2005. Todd Landman was one of the first
researchers to hypothesize that we could expect very different levels of compliance with
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human rights treaties based on the nature of the governing regime. He noticed that
democracies ratify these agreements more readily than do autocracies, and third- and
fourth-wave democracies ratify more readily with fewer reservations than do the
established democracies. The third and fourth waves’ actual rights practices tend to be
far worse. Like all the quantitative human rights studies discussed above, Landman’s
general strategy is to use time-series cross-sectional analyses, but he endogenizes the
treaty commitment itself. He examines first the ratification decision and then the rights
indicators as dependent variables, followed by a two-stage estimation that endogenizes
treaty ratification with “instrumental” variables to explain rights practices. His key result:
the more committed a country is to a key rights treaty (taking reservations and optional
protocols into account), the stronger the improvement in rights practices. Unfortunately,
the key instruments in this study are not likely to be very valid. Ratification is modeled
as a function of democracy, wealth, and membership in IGOs and the presence (not welldefined) of NGOs, none of these can remotely be thought of as affecting human rights
practices only through their relationship with ratification. Even so, Landman did move
research forward by attempting to explain commitment and compliance simultaneously,
and by attempting to sort out the consequences of ratification in different political
contexts. He was also one of the first to demonstrate quantitatively any positive
consequences to the ratification of human rights treaties.
Nearly contemporaneously, similar studies were published of a very similar
nature. Taking an agnostic position toward theory, Erik Neumayer ran a similar
regression, this time interacting ratification with the continuous polity scale and with the
number of international non-governmental organizations per capita (Neumayer 2005).
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Like the studies above, Neumayer focused on two dependent variables: the Political
Terror Scale and the Freedom House measure of civil rights, and looked for effects of a
battery of treaties, including the ICCPR, the torture convention, these agreements’
optional protocols, and various regional agreements of a comparable nature. He found no
improvement or even worsening personal integrity rights among ratifiers who scored zero
on the polity scale, as well as among states with zero INGOs per capita (although one
should wonder whether the latter category is meaningful) Neumayer checks for the
robustness of these results with a Heckman selection model, with a curious justification
for instruments: he holds that ‘newly independent countries receive greater attention with
respect to their human rights record as do former colonies” (Neumayer 2005) but the
likelihood of scrutiny seems to be precisely the mechanism that drives his results for the
importance of INGOs and democracies.
More research effort has gone recently into the mechanisms through which human
rights treaties might be enforced. Emilie Hafner-Burton argues that human rights don’t
just improve on their own accord; improvements are instead associated with hard-nosed
efforts by the international community to link preferential trade agreements to
improvements (Hafner-Burton 2005). More recently, James Lebovic and Erik Voeten
have shown that the World Bank tends to reduce its aid to countries that have been named
as severe rights abusers by resolutions of the United Nations Human Rights Commission
(now Council) (Lebovic & Voeten 2009). But what no one has shown is that there is any
significant external enforcement behind the provisions of international human rights
treaties, of a kind that might plausibly account for the patterns of compliance observed
across a number of rights areas.
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Human rights treaties seem to elicit extraordinarily weak external enforcement
(the realists have a point here), appealing norms (highlighted by constructivists) and yet
the real stakeholders – almost unique among areas regulated by international treaties –
are overwhelmingly domestic groups and individuals. This has led to a new focus on
ways in which international treaties influence domestic politics. Beth Simmons argues
that international treaties can influence domestic politics in (at least) three ways. First,
they change national agendas; that is they put new issues on the legislative table that may
not be that controversial, but were most definitely exogenous to the national processes
that generate legislation. Dealing with what comes from the international community can
alter practices – as long as they are not too controversial. Second, Simmons argues that
treaties are important resources in many legal systems around the world. They can be
used in litigation directly (cited as an authoritative legal source) or they can give rise to
domestic implementing legislation which itself becomes a tool in local court cases. This
can only influence compliance of course when national courts are competent and
independent from national governments (Powell & Staton 2009). Third, treaties can be
useful to encourage local groups to mobilize to demand attention to rights compliance.
Ratified treaties encourage domestic stakeholders to begin to see themselves as such (an
“identity” mechanism, in constructivist terms). They are also a tool that can be used to
gain legitimacy, allies, and media attention. In effect, the ratification of international
human rights treaties change the political opportunity structure in ways that increase the
likelihood that governments will edge toward compliance with their obligations.
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This book-length study has the luxury of scale to explore these ideas in detail,
including quantitative and qualitative analyses of four different human rights treaty
regimes: civil and political rights, women rights, the torture convention, and children’s
rights. The primary finding is that treaties have their most consistent impacts where a
theory based on domestic politics would indeed expect them: in polities in which
domestic stakeholders have both the motive and the means to organize to demand
compliance. Simmons argues that in stable autocracies, citizens do not have a way to
mobilize without being crushed. In stable democracies, where rights are well-protected,
they have no real motive to mobilize. But treaties become useful tools precisely in those
cases in which locals have a reason to use them strategically to press their claims: in
partial and transitioning democracies. The results show that certain rights, such as
practices that reduce torture, are correlated with treaty ratification in this middle category
of countries, but not in stable democracies or autocracies. The women’s treaty has
improved girls’ and women’s access to jobs and education in secular countries and where
courts are independent enough to enforce the treaties’ implementing legislation. Overall,
there is a reasonable fit between Simmons’ theory of domestic mobilization and patterns
of treaty compliance across time and space.
If it were ever the case that findings about compliance with human rights treaties
are dependent on the use of qualitative versus quantitative methods (Hafner-Burton &
Ron 2009), the new research shows that such a claim in no longer tenable. Simmons’
largely quantitative study is generally positive about the possibilities for compliance with
international human rights treaties. On the other hand, another excellent study that is
largely qualitative is more skeptical. Sonia Cardenas’s study of compliance with human
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rights treaties utilizes both quantitative and qualitative methods, and finds that the more
national security seems to be at stake, and the stronger “pro-violation constituencies”
within a country, the more states are likely to violate human rights treaties and try
disingenuously to appear to comply with their obligations (Cardenas 2007). These claims
are not incompatible, neither do they rest on the peculiarities of quantitative versus
qualitative methods. The best research moves away from unqualified claims, and
develops a nuanced picture of how strategic as well as principled agents use treaties as
tools – sometimes successfully, sometime not – to achieve their rights objectives.

III. Conclusions
Research on compliance with and violation of international treaties has been a
growth industry within international relations subfield within the past decade. Space for
considering the relationship between rules and behavior opened up as structural realism
receded and a more strategic realism that could accommodate theories of self-enforcing
agreements, signaling, and hands-tying came to take its place. Far from idealist, this
literature developed under the assumption that much if not most treaty compliance could
be understood in terms of self-interested behavior, properly understood. In the absence
of third party enforcement, reciprocity was often the only hope for sustained cooperation
in some issue areas, such as the laws of war. But what is become clearer is that treaties
have made an important contribution to the ability of states to contract with one another:
to make deals that are credible and follow rules that are relatively clear.
Perhaps the best way to characterize the contribution of treaties to the broader
problem of cooperation is to emphasize their deeper social meaning. They heighten

44
reputational costs precisely because the international community and domestic audiences
understand them as serious obligations that signal a commitment to behave according to a
specified set of rules. They legitimate certain claims and de-legitimate others. The great
intellectual leap forward has been to develop a wider peripheral vision about what
constitutes a fully specified rational model of treaty compliance. Without a theory of
social constructed norms to gird a claim about the reputation consequences of noncompliance, we have understood only half of the problem and still cannot grasp what it it
about treaties that seems to “put it all on the line” for states reputationally. Without a
theory of socially constructed norms, we can do little better than to gesture towards
crucial yet hollow constructs such as “common knowledge” essential to the establishment
of focal points and stable expectations about behavior. The partial collapse of distinct
and mutually exclusive schools of thought has hastened a clearer understanding of
compliance with what on the surface appear to be no more than scraps of paper.
That is all to the good, but hurdles in this research program remain. I have
mentioned at various points in this review the problem of endogeneity and selection
effects; these are rampant and mar to some extent many if not most of the studies in this
review. A few of these studies are fortunate that a fairly exogenous process has
stimulated the compliance problem – such as the United States effort to get states not to
cooperate with the ICC in Judith Kelley’s study. Other studies such those of Sarah
Mitchell and Paul Hensel, Beth Simmons, and Todd Landman, evince an awareness of
the problem and try to employ statistical methods to address it, with varying degrees of
success. At this point, there are no perfect solutions or easy fixes. But it is important to
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think about the prelude to the compliance question: why a particular agreement was
designed as it was, and what may have motivated states to ratify in the first place.
Several new directions might prove useful and necessary in the study of treaty
behavior. One would be to move away from a state centric model of compliance and take
more seriously the role of non-state actors as either facilitating or hindering treaty
compliance or effectiveness. James Morrow’s consideration of the complications that
individuals often commit war crimes – counter to the policies or desires of their state is a
welcome wrinkle to an account of compliance with the laws of war. Elizabeth
DeSombre’s discussion of the agency problems involving states and shipping interests
reminds us that compliance cannot always be commanded from the top down. John
Ruggie’s recent writing (Ruggie 2007) on the problem of corporate responsibility and
compliance with respect to international human rights standards should inspire us to
supplement our focus on country-years with data on the policies and actions of firms
themselves. It would also be interesting to do more research across levels of analysis to
compare treaty compliance with the response to similar regulations on the national or
regional level. When Michael Zürn and colleagues compared compliance national
compliance with compliance patterns at the regional and international level, they were
surprised to find that “In none of our sets of comparisons is compliance systematically
better in the national context than in settings beyond the nation-state” (Zürn & Joerges
2005). Innovative research designs of a comparative nature will help to deepen our
knowledge about what makes international law compliance especially problematic (or
not).
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Most of the political science literature on treaties is focused, appropriately, on a
behavioral definition of compliance as policies that converge toward those required by
the legal obligation in question. As the field begins to mature, we would do well to think
about the policy implications of the behaviors we are documenting and modeling. Is
treaty compliance always good, and violation always bad? Certainly avoiding the
intentional killing of civilians as a matter of strategy is by almost any standard a good
outcome, but legal rules can also be used to justify certain war-fighting techniques that
continue to devastate human settlements (Smith 2002). Critical legal theorists – whose
lack of a forward looking research agenda has contributed to their waning influence – do
(repeatedly) make at least one good point: law is not an end in itself. For now the
challenge has been to demonstrate international law’s effects on state behavior. Once our
research matures, we would do well to reflect more broadly on the normative
consequences that violation and compliance entail.
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